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I. THE APPELLATE COURT'S JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction is pursuant to The Utah Judicial Code, §§ 78A-4-
103(2)(a), (f) (2008), as well as Rules 3 and 4 of The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
as this appeal arises from a final order and judgment of a District Court and an order of 
the District Court denying a petition for an extraordinary writ where Appellant1 is 
incarcerated for a conviction of a Second Degree Felony. 
II. THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Issue One 
1. The Issue; Evidence and testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and 
incorporated into the record on Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
demonstrated by preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner/Appellant was entitled to 
withdraw his plea of guilty as unknowingly and involuntarily entered where the trial 
court failed to conduct an adequate colloquy with the Appellant in violation of 
Appellant's due process rights. 
2. Standard of review: "The question of "[w]hether the [district] court strictly complied 
with rule 11 is a question of law, reviewed for correctness." State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, 
^[10,114 P.3d 569,572. This non-deferential review for correctness is triggered when 
interpretation of the sentencing-court conduct implicates the "ultimate question" of 
compliance with the constitutional and procedural requirements for the entry of a plea. See 
State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, fl2,140 P.3d 1288,1291. 
1
 Also referred to herein as "Mr. Peterson." 
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In addition, interpretation of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and Rule 65C 
"present[ ] question[s] of law, which we also review for correctness and without 
deference to the lower court's conclusion." Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, f8; 89 
P.3d 196, 202; accord Moench v. State, 2002 UT App 333, f 4, 57 P.3d 1116, 1118. 
"Generally, an appeal from a judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief raises 
questions of law reviewed for correctness, [on which we give] no deference to the post-
conviction court's conclusion." Manning, at 200 (quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 
72,f 7, 61 P.3d 978). "We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a 
petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's 
conclusions of law." Id. (quoting Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,f 4, 43 P.3d 467 (citing 
Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah 1998)). 
3. Supporting Authority: Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, <H1 1,13,134 P.3d 
at 185-6 (referring to Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e)). State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1313 (Utah 
1987) (noting federal due process concerns with court's failure to ensure defendant 
understands what he is admitting to by entering the plea, as set forth in Henderson v. 
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645,96 S.Q. 2253, 2257,49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976)); State v. 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 444 (Utah 1983) (stating court's ensuring defendant's voluntariness 
and knowingness in entering plea protect defendant's due process rights under Utah Const, 
art. I, §7). 
B. Issue Two 
1. The Issue; Evidence and testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and 
incorporated into the record on Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
demonstrated by preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner/Appellant was entitled to 
withdraw his plea of guilty as unknowingly and involuntarily entered where he was 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Appellant's due process rights. 
Former counsel coerced Appellant to plead guilty against his will and without ensuring 
he was competent to enter the plea, failed to take an active role in the proceedings against 
Appellant, held an adversarial relationship with Appellant, and had an actual conflict of 
interest while representing Appellant. 
2. Standard of review; Whether habeas corpus petitioner was accorded right of 
counsel and was properly advised as to consequences of his plea of guilty in criminal trial 
are questions of fact. Brown v. Turner, 1968, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968. When 
reviewing the denial of a petition for relief under the PCRA, '"we will set aside the 
district court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, and we review its 
conclusions of law for correctness.'" Thomas v. State, 2002 UT 128,14, 63 P.3d 672 
(quoting Seel v. Van Der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998)). 
3. Supporting Authority: The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." U.S. Const, amend. VI. The Supreme Court has based this right as stemming from 
defense counsel's critical role in the "ability of the adversarial system to produce just 
results." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,685,104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
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(1984). The right to effective assistance of counsel "includes the right to counsel free from 
conflicts of interest." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,72 (Utah App.1990) (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct. at 2065). In Strickland, the Court established a test where a defendant 
is required to show (1) deficient performance by counsel, and (2) prejudice to the defense. Id. 
466 U.S. at 687,104 S.Ct. at 2064; see also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,186-7 (Utah 
1991) (adopting two-prong Strickland test). 
However, in another case, decided on the same date as Strickland, the Supreme Court 
created an exception to the second requirement of showing prejudice when the deficient 
performance of counsel is particularly egregious. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 
658,104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), cited in Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 
1152 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc) ("[T]he Supreme Court created an exception to the Strickland 
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and acknowledged that certain circumstances 
are so egregiously prejudicial that ineffective assistance of counsel will be presumed"). 
"Cronic presumes prejudice where there has been an actual breakdown in the adversarial 
process at trial." Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d lA\,lAAn.2 (9th Cir.). 
The existence of actual conflict of interest by former defense counsel can invoke the 
exception to Strickland's prejudice showing on appeal or by way of a habeas corpus petition 
if the defendant demonstrates "that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his 
lawyer's performance.'" State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State 
v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 
S.Ct. 1708,1718,64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980))). 
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III. PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE BELOW 
Petitioner/Appellant preserved the issues for this appeal by presenting these issues 
to the Trial Court below. The issues listed herein were presented in a sufficiently clear 
manner to the Trial Court, in counsel's oral arguments and evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing, such that the judges of Appellant's underlying matter had a clear 
opportunity to rule on each issue presented. The Trial Court then issued its final Order 
from which this Appeal is taken. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
While this is not a Constitutional case, per se, the Due Process Clause, as applied 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to The United States Constitution, is an underlying 
authority for determining this appeal. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final order of the Second Judicial District Court denying 
Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief that was based on a criminal matter 
resulting in a conviction of Sexual Abuse of Minor, under Utah Stat. Ann. § 76-5-401.1, 
amended to a Second Degree Felony. Appellant did not enter his plea of guilty to sexual 
abuse of a minor voluntarily or with intelligence. He was not competent to proceed much 
less to enter a plea. He is mentally retarded, borderline at the least, with a history of bi-
polar and severe clinical depression. 
A. Statement of Material Facts 
1) Procedural History of Criminal Case No. 041902251 and the Instant Case 
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On April 22, 2004, the State of Utah charged Petitioner with one count of 
"Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child," a lst-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-404.1(3) (2003), for events alleged to have occurred between September 2003 and 
March 2004. This case was filed as No. 041902251. On November 1, 2005, the day trial 
was set for, Petitioner appeared before District Judge P.G. Heffernan and entered a plea 
of "no contest" to one count of "Sexual Abuse of a Minor," a 2d-degree felony. John 
Caine ("Caine") and Grant W. P. Morrison ("Morrison") served as counsel retained by 
Petitioner. 
On January 10, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year and not more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. This prison term 
was suspended where Petitioner was to serve one year in jail, with work release if 
possible, and put on probation for 36 months. The conditions of his probation included 
entering an agreement with AP&P and compliance therewith, no committing violations of 
the law, being released to NUCCC when a bed space becomes available and successfully 
completing that program, complying with all Group "A" sex offender conditions, and 
having no contact with the victim or her family. 
On April 18, 2006, Judge Pamela Heffernan revoked Petitioner's probation and 
reinstated his stayed sentence of one to fifteen years to be served in Utah State Prison. 
Hence, Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the Central Utah Correctional Facility, in 
Gunnison, Utah. 
On or about November 17, 2006, Appellant filed a Petition for Post-Conviction 
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Relief. On November 26, 2007, an evidentiary took place where testimony and evidence 
was admitted in addition to the incorporation of Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief and exhibits as part of the record. On December 17, 2007, the parties submitted 
written closing arguments and proposed findings of fact and law. On or about January 22, 
2008, Judge Pamela Heffernan issued a final order denying Appellant's Petition on all 
claims. 
2) Statement of Material Facts2 
I) FIRST CLAIM - Petitioner's Conviction Should be Reversed Because the Trial 
Court Did Not Adequately Ensure Petitioner Was Entering the Plea Voluntarily and 
Knowingly as Required under Utah R.Crim. P. Rule 11 and the Due Process Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution and Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. 
1. Petitioner petitions this court for relief from the conviction resulting from that plea. 
2. After Petitioner was first charged in 2004, he retained Grant Morrison for his defense. 
Morrison brought in John Caine as a "consultant" for Petitioner's defense. This was despite 
Petitioner's objections where Caine had successfully represented the woman, Jeri Daines, 
accused of the first-degree murder of Petitioner's three-month-old son, Clancy Peterson, in 
2001. Petitioner had experienced long-term depression after his son's homicide and desired 
that the attorney who exonerated his son's alleged murderer would have no part in his own 
2
 These facts are gleaned from the evidence admitted at the evidentiary hearing, which 
took place on November 26, 2007, and the transcript of which has been provided. 
Included at that evidentiary hearing, J. Heffernan incorporated into the record the 
Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and all of its exhibits as part of the 
record. Appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of his Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief cites with particularity to each tabbed exhibit that was attached 
thereto. The facts cited hereon are gleaned directly from all of this evidence admitted into 
the record. 
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defense. When Petitioner's mother and Petitioner brought up their concern to Morrison of 
Caine's representing Petitioner, Morrison said it was no problem and dismissed the issue as 
irrelevant. Morrison insisted that Caine's representation presented no possible conflicts of 
interest, and Caine advised Petitioner or appeared on his behalf in many instances. 
3. In the course of Petitioner's defense, Caine made statements indicating he thought 
that Petitioner was "stupid." At one point, Caine angrily told Petitioner that he had 
embarrassed Caine and ruined his reputation where Caine had been representing Petitioner as 
if Petitioner were innocent. Morrison remarked haughtily several times that Petitioner was 
too slow mentally to understand many procedures and treated Petitioner as if he were too 
stupid to understand his advice. Before the plea hearing, Petitioner's defense attorney 
Morrison treated him impatiently as if he were tired of explaining things. Right after 
Petitioner had entered his plea on this case on May 24, 2006, Morrison stated that he doubted 
Petitioner was mentally capable of understanding the proceedings in court. Petitioner 
suffers from psychological disorders which have variously been diagnosed as anxiety 
disorder, depressive disorder, unspecified learning disorder, and attention-deficit disorder, 
many stemming from the loss of his son in 2001. Due to their impatience with Petitioner's 
slow comprehension, Petitioner's defense counsel failed to take adequate time to explain his 
plea statement and prior stipulation of dismissal to him. 
4. Neither counsel ever told Petitioner he had a good chance of acquittal before they 
pressured him to plead guilty. Yet Caine conceded in open court that good chance of 
acquittal in this case: "[V]ery frankly, there were issues that could have been tried in both 
8 
[Weber and Davis County] cases that could have arisen in an acquittal. And the State knew 
that, and we knew that." 
5. Neither counsel sought Petitioner's informed consent to agree to the stipulation of 
dismissal wherein it mandated that Petitioner later plead guilty to a crime he had consistently 
denied committing to counsel. By the time of Petitioner's plea hearing defense counsel 
simply advised Petitioner what to say in court. 
6. Petitioner wished to have a trial in the, particularly because he maintained he was not 
guilty of sexual abuse of a minor or of lewdness involving a child. He entered a guilty plea 
with the misunderstanding that he was not admitting to the crime charged. In fact, his plea 
statement did admit to the facts of the crime. Had Mr. Peterson understood this, he 
would not have pled no-contest because he maintains to this day that he did not commit 
the crime. 
7. During Petitioner's plea colloquy before Judge Pamela Heffernan, the court relied 
heavily on Petitioner's "Statement of Petitioner in Support of Guilty Plea" to apprise it of the 
voluntariness of the plea and to enter into the record Petitioner's understanding of the 
constitutional rights he was waiving, his right to move to withdraw his plea, and the other 
elements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court did not verbally 
inquire into me elements enumerated in Rule 11. When asked whether Petitioner 
understood his plea statement at first Petitioner expressed difficulty understanding his plea. 
The court inquired of defense counsel what had been done to help him understand, to which 
9 
Caine replied he had read the statement to Petitioner "verbatim." Only at this point did 
Petitioner state that he had understood the plea statement. 
8. Although the "Statement of Petitioner in Support of Guilty Plea" contends that 
Petitioner supposedly admitted to touching a "child under the age of 14 on the vaginal 
area for purposes of gratifying a sexual desire" yet at the plea hearing the "factual basis" 
was devoid of sexual intent: "[T]he allegation of the victim is that he picked her up, 
placed her on his lap, put his hand down the front of her pants on the bare skin, and 
touched her genitals." Any admission to the "allegation" is also wholly absent at the 
hearing. It is no small wonder that Petitioner did not know he was admitting to the factual 
elements of "Sexual Abuse of a Child." 
9. The bulk of the colloquy was actually conducted with Petitioner's defense 
counsel, Caine. The court relied on the assertions of defense counsel that Petitioner 
understood the plea statement because it had allegedly been read to him "verbatim" 
despite uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy. The court did not clarify 
Petitioner's counsel's contradictions and ambiguities when counsel was assuring the 
court the entire plea statement had been read to Petitioner. Although Caine conceded 
when he went over the plea agreement with Petitioner "the [plea] statement wasn't there," 
he had read it "Une for line" to Petitioner. In fact, Caine had not read the plea agreement 
"verbatim" to Petitioner but had only gone over the "basics" of it. 
10. Petitioner only stated to the court that he understood the plea statement because he 
was intimidated by the court proceedings he did not understand, by his attorney's 
10 
admonitions that he was too stupid to understand, and by the fact he did not want to 
embarrass his attorney by contradicting counsel's having said he read the plea statement to 
Petitioner "verbatim" when he did not. 
11. Furthermore, the trial court failed to carry its burden of ensuring that Petitioner 
understood his time-limited right to appeal or withdraw his plea under Rule 11 's strict 
compliance requirement. The court never asked Petitioner whether he understood his 
appeal rights. The court mentioned to Petitioner that he had a right to jury trial, to cross 
examination of witnesses against him, to be present at trial, not to testify himself, and to 
presumed innocence until proven guilty. 
12. The court then indicated it would go over all of his rights but that it would not be 
necessary to "go[] over it and over it and over it unless I need to." Such an offering 
would not be welcome to many, much less a defendant who is already visibly intimidated 
by his attorney and the whole process such that Caine answered in Petitioner's stead half 
of the questions posed to Petitioner by the court. 
13. Hence, the court failed to adequately incorporate the plea statement into the record 
by showing Petitioner had thoroughly understood it. The trial court simply relied on 
representations by defense counsel that Petitioner understood the plea statement. 
14. Due to his psychological condition, Petitioner had difficulties understanding the 
proceedings, the consequences of his plea, and the nature of his constitutional rights. The 
trial court failed to evince any further evidence that Petitioner understood his guilty plea. 
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II) SECOND CLAIM - Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance 
of Counsel Was Violated Where His Defense Counsel Caine's Loyalties Were 
Divided and He Did Not Act as an Effective Advocate to Ensure a Fair Adversarial 
Proceeding 
A. An Actual Conflict of Interest Existed Where Petitioner's Trial Counsel Caine 
Had Divided Loyalties between a Former Client and Petitioner 
15. Caine's former successful defense of the woman accused to Petitioner's 3-month-old 
son became a problem in the course of his representation of Petitioner. When representing 
Petitioner Caine exhibited divided loyalty to his own reputation and his former client he had 
successfully defended in 2001. Daines was the owner and operator of the daycare where 
Petitioner's 3-month-old son Clancy was shaken to death. In essence, as the parents of the 
minor victim, Boyd and Natalie Peterson were represented by the State in that case in 
prosecuting their son's death. Caine represented the defendant Daines. 
16. Caine had publicly stated he believed in Jeri Daines' innocence. Yet Petitioner 
wanted to testify as to how her harmful or negligent behavior toward his son affected his 
mind and attitude toward children. Petitioner, his family, and those who knew him in the 
community wanted to testify to Petitioner's reputation in the community and how through 
Jeri Daines' act or negligence to act to protect his son Petitioner was seen to have softened 
even more toward children and became more protective of them. Such testimony would have 
been oppositional and embarrassing to Caine who had vigorously defended Daines' 
innocence. An actual conflict of interest that adversely affected Caine's performance also 
exists where Caine had a divided loyalty to his former client, Jeri Daines, such that 
Caine's divided loyalty adversely affected Caine's performance where Caine could not 
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have raised or avoided raising 1) a legitimate argument of Petitioner's incapacity to hurt a 
child, or 2) an affirmative defense of Petitioner's mental state. 
17. Such testimony would have been oppositional and embarrassing to Caine who had 
vigorously defended Daines' innocence. "That case I'm very proud of.... Jeri Daines 
wasn't just not guilty, she was innocent." Caine had an actual conflict from putting 
Petitioner on the stand because Petitioner would have testified about his pain toward 
mistreatment of children due to the pain he suffered from Jeri Daines' having negligently 
killed his son. This would have been a legitimate argument for Caine to take with 
Petitioner, but he made the choice not to go that way, even saying to Petitioner that he 
would never put him on the stand because he is too "stupid" and would not say the "right 
things." Instead, Caine convinced Petitioner to take a plea to avoid the embarrassment 
that Petitioner's testimony would have caused Caine and the threat it would have posed to 
his loyalty to his former client, whose innocence Caine believed in. 
18. Caine and Morrison pressured and coerced Petitioner to take a plea despite the wishes 
of Petitioner and his family to testify about the effect of Clancy's murder on Petitioner and 
how the abusive and neglectful actions of Caine's former client, Jeri Daines, rendered 
Appellant more sensitive to the harm that can come to a child than ever before; despite 
Petitioner's good chance for acquittal; despite Petitioner's repeated assertion of innocence 
concerning the underlying charges; despite Petitioner's repeatedly expressing difficulty in 
understanding counsels' advice; and explanations of the legal procedures and consequences. 
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B. Caine's Failure to Counsel Petitioner of His Option of Going to Trial with the 
Insanity or Mental Infirmity Defense Was Due to His Divided Loyalty and Thus 
Constitutes Presumed Conflict of Interest which is Prima Facia Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 
19. Caine had to make the choice not to counsel Petitioner of his option to raise the 
defense of mental illness. This defense of mental illness or diminished capacity would have 
been based on Petitioner's severe clinically diagnosed depression stenaming from the death 
of his son that he felt was caused by the negligence of Caine's former client, Jeri Daines. 
Caine would not bring up the effects of Petitioner's severe depression as it was relevant to 
Petitioner's criminal responsibility. This was so because Petitioner's depression stemmed 
originally from what Petitioner construed as the murder of his son by Caine's former client, 
whose innocence Caine believed in. 
C. Caine's Coercion of Petitioner Constituted an Actual Conflict of Interest that 
Adversely Affected Counsel's Performance and Was Hence Presumed Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 
20. Where Caine coerced Petitioner to accept a plea by misleading Petitioner of his 
chances of acquittal, and subjected Petitioner to persuasion and influence such that the 
Petitioner's will was overborne, the plea is not only unknowingly and involuntarily 
entered and Caine's behavior exhibited a clear and actual conflict of interest. Hence, 
where a plea is entered based on trial counsel's interests that are oppositional to 
defendant's, based on coercion and false promises by trial counsel to defendant, under 
circumstances of severe emotional distress and duress of the defendant, and where trial 
counsel knew or should have known his client mentally and emotionally was highly 
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susceptible to counsel's advise, conflict of interest is presumed. 
21. Caine coerced Petitioner to enter a plea of guilty although Petitioner continued to 
deny he committed the crimes he was charged with and Caine conceded in open court 
that this case as well as the Davis County case could have resulted in acquittals. "[V]ery 
frankly, there were issues that could have been tried in both cases that could have arisen 
in an acquittal. And the State knew that, and we knew that." Although Caine concluded 
there was a good chance of acquittal, Caine urged Petitioner to enter a plea of no contest 
by promising him he would "go home sooner." 
22. Caine took advantage of Petitioner's vulnerable state of mind, mental illness, and 
low IQ by exerting his will over Petitioner. Caine did not adequately explain to Petitioner 
that by pleading no contest he was confessing to the factual elements of sexual abuse of 
the alleged victim. Petitioner was visibly intimidated by Caine. Evidence of Caine's 
dominating and coercive behavior toward Petitioner in regard to Petitioner's plea can be 
found at the change of plea hearing on November 1, 2005, where Petitioner was clearly 
too intimidated to speak without Caine's prompting him and where Caine answered in 
Petitioner's stead half of the questions posed to Petitioner by the court. 
23. Caine held an adversarial relationship with Petitioner. In the course of this case, 
Caine repeatedly charged Petitioner with being "stupid." Caine refused to allow 
Petitioner to take the stand, telling him he should plead out because he was too "stupid" 
to take the stand and would not say the "right things." Caine angrily told Petitioner that 
he had embarrassed him and ruined his reputation where Caine had been representing 
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Petitioner as if he were innocent. 
24. Further evidence of Caine's animosity toward Petitioner is present on the record at 
the probation revocation hearing. Although Caine conceded that all interested parties 
present as well as the court had listened to the tape of Petitioner's call to his niece, Caine 
felt compelled to represent the State's interests and view by characterizing for the court 
that the call was "the most colossally stupid thing that Petitioner could have done 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant will demonstrate in this appeal that his plea was involuntarily entered 
where the plea colloquy was insufficient. The Trial Court's acceptance of Appellant's 
plea, which he unwillingly and unintelligently entered, was in violation of Rule 11 of the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Appellant will also demonstrate that as a matter of fact and law his plea was 
unwillingly entered due to his attorney's conflict of interest and due to coercion by his 
attorneys to enter the plea. Appellants defense attorney, John Caine, had a conflict of 
interest that rendered his assistance to Appellant ineffective. Caine pressured Appellant 
repeatedly knowing that Appellant was emotionally and mentally vulnerable and that if 
Appellant went to trial eh would want to put his character at issue. By putting his 
character at issue, Appellant would have to bring up the abuse that Caine's former client 
caused Appellant and how that has made Appellant even more sensitive than ever to 
children. For that reason, and for the other foregoing reasons, Mr. Peterson respectfully 
requests that the Trial Court's Order denying his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief be 
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reversed where the law, along with the facts, as admitted, supports a holding that Mr. 
Peterson did not enter his plea intelligently and voluntarily. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. FIRST CLAIM 
1. Peterson's Conviction Should be Reversed Because the Trial Court Did Not 
Adequately Ensure Peterson Was Entering the Plea Voluntarily and 
Knowingly as Required under Utah R.Crim. P. Rule 11 and the Due Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. 
A defendant's conviction should be reversed where the defendant believed his no-
contest plea would not amount to an admission to the elements of the crime, the 
prosecution did not meet its burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and the trial court never explained his time-limited right to withdraw 
the plea and appeal. To satisfy due process rights and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, a trial court must adequately ensure by way of colloquy with the 
defendant that he voluntarily and knowingly understands all rights waived and retained 
under Rule 11(e). Bluemel v. State, UT App, ffl 11, 13, 134 P.3d at 185-6 (referring to 
Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e)). To ensure compliance with a defendant's due process rights the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that trial courts must strictly comply with Rule 11(e)'s 
elements. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987) (noting federal due 
process concerns with court's failure to ensure defendant understands what he is 
admitting to by entering the plea, as set forth in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 
645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257,49 L.Ed.2d 108(1976)); State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 444 
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(Utah 1983) (stating court's ensuring defendant's voluntariness and knowingness in 
entering plea protect defendant's due process rights under Utah Const, art. I, § 7). 
"The question of "[w]hether the [district] court strictly complied with rule 11 is a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness." State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28,110, 114 P.3d 
569, 572. This nondeferential review for correctness is triggered when interpretation of 
the sentencing-court conduct implicates the "ultimate question" of compliance with the 
constitutional and procedural requirements for the entry of a plea. See State v. 
Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, f 12, 140 P.3d 1288, 1291. 
a) The District Court Failed to Strictly Comply with Rule 11(e) 's Factors 
Because of Its Insufficient Colloquy with Peterson and Inadequate 
Incorporation of the Plea Agreement into the Record 
A court may strictly comply with Rule 11(e) criteria and still avoid going over the 
plea statement verbatim with the defendant only under certain circumstances. First, the 
statement must be "properly incorporated in the record' whereby "the trial judge 
ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant has read, has understood and 
acknowledges all the information contained therein." Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 
141,114, 134, P.3d at 185-6 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 
217 (Utah 1991). Second, during the colloquy any "omissions or ambiguities in the 
[statement] must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in 
the course of the plea colloquy." Id. at f l5 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 
Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117 f 19, 69 P.3d 838, 842 
(reversing conviction where defendant did not adequately acknowledge plea affidavit, 
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and verbal colloquy did not fully satisfy U. R.Crim.P. 11). Hence, the defendant's 
comprehension of the plea statement notwithstanding, the court must "meaningfully 
engage" the defendant to ascertain on the record his voluntariness and understanding of 
the Rule 11(e) factors. See State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, <f 16, 140 P.3d 1288, 1292 
("Over time we have made clear that a sentencing judge must communicate to a 
defendant the full complement of information found in rule 11 concerning the rights he 
is relinquishing by pleading guilty"). 
In State v. Maguire, the Utah Court of Appeals clarified the rule for ensuring a 
plea is entered knowing and voluntarily under Gibbon's strict compliance test. 830 P.2d 
216, 218 (Utah 1992), rejecting State v. Dastrup, 818 P.2d 594, 596-99 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (mistakenly interpreting Hojfs3 ^re-Gibbons application of Rule 11 "in the 
record" requirement to mean only the transcript of the oral plea colloquy so that "the 
trial court must base its findings solely on the colloquy, without considering any 
statements made in the affidavit"). 
"Rule 11 requires the trial court to find that seven [now eight] detailed and 
specific criteria have been fulfilled. Utah R.Crim.P. 1 l(5)(a)-(g) [now 
1 l(e)(l)-(8)]. The record before an appellate court must contain a basis for 
such findings, but that record may reflect such a basis by multiple means, 
e.g., transcript of the oral colloquy between the court and defendant, 
contents of a written affidavit that the record reflects was read, understood, 
and acknowledged by defendant and the court, contents of other documents 
such as the information, presentence reports, exhibits, etc., similarly 
incorporated into the record....[T]he record may include the contents of 
(such ) documents [only] where they have been properly incorporated and it 
3
 See State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119,1122 (Utah 1991). 
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is clear that they are indeed part of the defendant's knowledge and 
understanding." 
Id. To incorporate the plea statement into the record by establishing the 
defendant's understanding of the Rule 119e) criteria in said statement a trial court must 
elicit sufficient response from a defendant personally in the colloquy and cannot rely too 
much upon the defense attorney's certifying that he or she thoroughly explained and 
counseled the defendant of his Rule 11(e) rights and admissions. "The practice of simply 
relying on defense attorneys and plea affidavits to explain the waiver of constitutional 
rights and to determine that a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary in every significant 
respect was deemed insufficient [by Gibbons], and that burden was placed on the judge." 
State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1312). The United States Supreme Court has long established that the colloquy must be 
with the defendant, not the defense attorney. 
"UJt is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea to be entered against a 
defendant solely on the consent of the defendant's agent [—] his lawyer. 
Our cases make absolutely clear that the choice to plead guilty must be the 
defendant's; it is he who must be informed of the consequences of his plea 
and what it is that he waives when he pleads, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, [89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274] (1969); and it is on his admission that 
he is in fact guilty that his conviction will rest. Id. at 650, 96 S.Ct. at 2260. 
Because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11(e) and Boykin, the 
law places the burden of establishing compliance with those requirements 
on the trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make 
sure that their clients fully understand the contents of the affidavit." 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 n. 4 (quoting Henderson, 426 U.S. 637, 650, 96 
S.Ct. 2253, 2260, 49 L.Ed.2d 10 (1976) (j- White, concurring). Hence, the trial judge can 
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only rely on the plea statement as evidence of 1) a defendant's understanding of a plea 
agreement and 2) a defendant's voluntarily entering such a plea once the statement is 
properly incorporated into the record by way of an adequate colloquy between the judge 
and the defendant. 
i. Rule 11 (e)(2) and 11 (e)(4)(A)-(B) Was Not Established on 
the Record Sufficiently to Ensure Peterson's Understanding 
and Voluntariness of Entering a Plea of No Contest or Guilty 
One important element of Rule 11(e) goes to the defendant's understanding of the 
factual basis for entering the plea. "The court has an undoubted duty to guard against 
the possibility that an accused who is innocent of the crime charged may be induced to 
plead guilty without sufficient understanding of the nature of the charge or the 
consequences of his plea...." State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1978). In 
applying the Rule 11(e) strict compliance analysis, the factual elements of the charges 
against the defendant must be explained in taking the guilty plea so that the defendant 
understands and admits those elements. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 
(Utah 1987) (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Q. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 
418 (1969) (applying the analogous Rule 11 of Fed. R. Crim.P). "There is no adequate 
substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge against him." McCarthy, at 466, 467, 470, 89 
S.Ct. at 1170, 1171, 1172 (citations omitted, footnotes omitted, emphasis in the 
original). "The judge must determine 'that the conduct which the defendant admits 
constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense included 
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therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty." Id. at 1313 (quoting McCarthy, at 
470). 
Hence, applying Utah's Rule 11(e)(4)4, a conviction based on a plea of guilty 
cannot stand if there is no record of facts showing that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant or that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction. See e.g., State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 442-44 (Utah 
1983) (referring to U. R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(2)'s voluntariness requirement and Rule 
11(e)(4)). In Breckenridge, in the course of the colloquy the court explained the 
elements of the crime of arson, to which Breckenridge was charged and pleading guilty 
to, and asked if Breckenridge agreed he was guilty of those elements. Id. at 442. 
Although Breckenridge stated he was guilty of those elements, upon the court's request 
that he recount the act of arson he committed, Breckemidge's narrative revealed an 
absence of the necessary element of intent. 688 P.2d at 442. Hence, "[b]ecause 
Breckenridge's guilty plea was involuntarily made," the court held "that the judgment of 
conviction was entered without due process of law in violation of Utah Const, art. I, § 
1... and "must therefore be vacated and the plea set aside." Id. at 444. See also 
4
 It must be established that the defendant understands the "nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements." Utah R. Crim.P. 11(e)(4)(A). Rule 11(e)(4)(B) 
requires there be a sufficient factual basis for the plea where it must establish "that the 
charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). 
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Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257-58 (holding plea cannot 
be constitutionally voluntary if defendant has such incomplete understanding of charge 
that his plea cannot stand as intelligent admission of guilt where receiving "real notice of 
the true nature of the charge against him [is the first and most universally recognized 
requirement of due process") (citations omitted). 
ii. Rule 11 (e)(7)-(8) Was Not Established on the Record 
Sufficiently to Ensure Peterson's Understanding and 
Voluntariness of Entering of Plea of No Contest or Guilty 
The trial court carries the burden of specifically ensuring that the defendant 
understood his time-limited right to appeal or withdraw his plea under Rule 11' s strict 
compliance requirement. See Rule 1 l(e)(7)-(8). Comparably, the Bluemel trial court 
relied upon the defendant's plea affidavit to ensure Ms. Bluemel understood the 
constitutional rights she waived by pleading guilty. 2006 UT App 141, f 18, 134 P.3d 
186, 187. The Utah Court of Appeals ruled the trial court's "critical error" was in failing 
to assure itself of Ms. Bluemel's understanding of those constitutional rights, beyond 
Ms. Bluemel's acknowledgement in her plea affidavit. Id., 11 15. The court did not 
properly incorporate the plea statement into the record where during the plea colloquy it 
only asked the defendant if she had "any questions about the statement." Id. at f 15. 
Because the trial court "failed to inform Bluemel of all of the rule 11(e) factors and 
rights," the Utah Court of Appeals held the plea statement was not properly incorporated 
into the record, and that the trial court did not sufficiently conduct a rule 11 colloquy. 
Id. atf 16 (emphasis added). 
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Rule 1 l(e)(7)-8 are two of the eight important factors a court must establish on the 
record that the defendant understands. That is, before accepting a plea of no-contest or 
guilty, a court must find that "the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing 
any motion to withdraw the plea; and the defendant has been advised that the right of 
appeal is limited." Utah R. Crim. P. ll(e)(7)-(8). 
B. SECOND CLAIM 
1. Peterson's Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
Was Violated Where His Defense Counsel Caine's Loyalties Were 
Divided and He Did Not Act as an Effective Advocate to Ensure a Fair 
Adversarial Proceeding 
In the instant case, the Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of counsel 
was prima facie violated where a conflict of interest is presumed. It was also violated 
when defense counsel assisted the prosecution and did not act as an effective advocate to 
ensure a just adversarial proceeding. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const, amend. VI. The Supreme Court has based this 
right as stemming from defense counsel's critical role in the "ability of the adversarial 
system to produce just results." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The right to effective assistance of counsel 
"includes the right to counsel free from conflicts of interest." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
65, 72 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065). In 
Strickland, the Court established a test where a defendant is required to show (1) 
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deficient performance by counsel, and (2) prejudice to the defense. Id. 466 U.S. at 687, 
104 S.Ct. at 2064; see also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-7 (Utah 1991) (adopting 
two-prong Strickland test). 
However, in another case, decided on the same date as Strickland, the Supreme 
Court created an exception to the second requirement of showing prejudice when the 
deficient performance of counsel is particularly egregious. See United States v. Cronic, 
466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), cited in Stano v. 
Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1152 (111th Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("[T]he Supreme Court created 
an exception to the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and 
acknowledged that certain circumstances are so egregiously prejudicial that ineffective 
assistance of counsel will be presumed"). "Cronic presumes prejudice where there has 
been an actual breakdown in the adversarial process at trial." Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 
F.2d 741, 744 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1990). 
The presence of a conflict of interest for the defense counsel can invoke this 
exception. "[A] sixth amendment claim grounded on conflict of interest is a special 
subtype of ineffectiveness claim, which must be examined under a somewhat different 
standard that was first enunciated in pre-Strickland cases." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 
71. The "adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires that the 
accused have 'counsel acting in the role of an advocate.'" Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655, 104 
S.Ct. at 2045 (citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1399, 18 
L.Ed.2d 493 (1967)). Thus, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is the right of 
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the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the "crucible of meaningful 
adversarial testing." United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 1991). 
a) An Actual Conflict of Interest Existed Where Peterson's Trial Counsel 
Caine Had Divided Loyalties between a Former Client and Peterson 
The presence of a conflict of interest for the defense counsel can invoke the 
exception to Stickland's prejudice showing on appeal by way of a habeas corpus petition 
if the defendant demonstrates "that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his 
lawyer's performance.'" State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
State v. Taylor, P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 
348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980))). To establish an actual conflict of 
interest, defendants must show that due to trial counsel's divided loyalty he or she "was 
required to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of his client's 
interests." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 686 (citations omitted). Petitioner has the burden of 
demonstrating with specificity that the actual conflict existed and adversely affected 
[trial counsel's] performance." Id; see also State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah 
App. 1991). "If the defendant makes such a showing of [actual conflict], prejudice need 
not be demonstrated to prevail on the claim," rather it will be presumed that the 
defendant was prejudiced by the lawyer's performance. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 
488 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046; Cuyler, 
446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1718-19; Webb, 790 P.2d at 73). Furthermore, 
"[d]efense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representation and to 
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advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises during the course of trial." 
State v. Webb, 790 P. 2d 65, 72 (Utah App. 1990). 
b) Caine's Failure to Counsel Peterson of His Option of Going to Trial 
with the Insanity or Mental Infirmity Defense Was Due to His Divided 
Loyalty and Thus Constitutes Presumed Conflict of Interest which is 
Prima Facie Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Conflicts of interest involving an attorney's divided loyalties do not always trigger 
applications of local rules of professional conduct. The Utah Court of Appeals reasoned 
that although "Counsel's conduct may be examined in light of prevailing professional and 
ethical standards to determine whether defendant received effective representation," 
violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provides but one possible way for 
courts to augment legal principles involving lawyer conduct. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 
484,489. 
In Johnson, the Utah Court of Appeals found an actual conflict of interest that 
would have adversely affected counsel's performance where evidence by State existed 
that the defense counsel had substantial knowledge of, and had participated in, one of the 
transactions that formed the basis of charges against the defendant. Id. Thus, trial 
counsel had interest (in exonerating himself) that was not consistent with defending his 
client. Id. What is more, counsel's integrity and credibility personally, and as defense 
counsel, were eroded by accusations, making him less effective in representing 
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defendant. Id. at 490. Applying Rule 1.7(b)5, the court stated that an actual conflict can 
be found if the client's representation appears to be adversely affected by the lawyer's 
other interests. See id. at 489 (citing Cmt, Utah R.Prof. Conduct 1.7). The court found 
dispositive that if defense counsel has an interest in the facts of the case, "it may be 
difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice." Id. 
Johnson also addressed the actual conflict that can arise under Utah Rule of 
Professional Conduct 8.4(d), which "addresses the institutional interest in ensuring that 
just verdicts are rendered in criminal cases—an interest that may be jeopardized by the 
existence of conflicts of interest." Id. at 489-90 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 
153, 108 S.Ct 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed 2d 140 (1988). Courts have an "interest in ensuring 
that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that 
legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." Id. "It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to.. .engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice." Id. (quoting Utah R.Prof. Conduct 8.4(d)). Irresponsible or improper conduct 
by a lawyer that adversely affects the fairness of proceedings undermines the "public's 
confidence in the bar" and erodes the legal process. Id. (citing United States v. Hobson, 
672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding actual conflict of interest where evidence of 
defense counsel's own involvement in crime impugned credibility and integrity of 
5
 Rule 1.7(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states in relevant part: "A lawyer 
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited 
by.. .the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) Each client consents after 
consultation." 
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counsel which would likely be detrimental to defendant), abrogated on other grounds by 
Flanagan v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 1053,465 U.S. 259, 263, 79 L.Ed.2d 288, 288 
(1984)). Thus, counsel's integrity and credibility personally, and as defense counsel, 
were eroded by accusations, making him less effective in representing defendant. 
Although Johnson and Hobson above had to do with defense counsel's own 
personal involvement in the crime the defendant was charged with, divided loyalty can 
also occur in less severe instances but when counsel avoids taking a position in one case 
that would be embarrassing to him because of or in another. See e.g., State v. Brandley, 
972 P.2d 78, 83. In dicta, the Brandley Court noted with support an English rule 
allowing "barristers to accept [conflicting] cases that are not professionally 
embarrassing...." Id. (quoting Peter W. Tague, Effective Advocacy for the Criminal 
Petitioner. The Barrister vs. The Lawyer23 (1996)). Brandley also reiterates the rule set 
forth above that to establish an actual conflict of interest defendants must show that trial 
counsel "was required to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of 
his client's interests." 972 P.2d at 85 (citing Taylor, 947 P.2d at 686 (citations omitted)). 
Hence, in summary of the above rules, presumed ineffective assistance of counsel 
exists when there is an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's 
performance. Brandley, 972 P.2d at 85. Such an actual conflict of interest exists where 
counsel had to make a choice between his interests and his client's. Taylor, 947 P.2d at 
686. It also exists where counsel is precluded from pursuing or avoids pursuing a 
legitimate argument or defense for his client because he realizes taking such a position 
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would be embarrassing. Brandley, at 83. The actual conflict arises where counsel made 
the choice to advance his own interest of avoiding embarrassment to the detriment of his 
client. Id. Furthermore, actual conflict exists where counsel's divided loyalty, be it 
personal or professional loyalty to a third party (who can be a former client), creates a 
situation of difficulty or impossibility for the lawyer to give his or her client detached 
advice. See Johnson, 823 P.2d at 489 (citing Cmt, Utah R.Prof. Conduct 1.7). Finally, 
an actual conflict of interest exists when counsel's choices are; so restricted that it is 
prejudicial to administration of justice. See id. (citing Utah R.Prof.Conduct 8.4(d)). 
However, although part of the analysis can include the consideration of whether 
counsel's divided loyalty was detrimental to his client, this "detriment" does not have to 
rise to the level of prejudice. See id. at 488. Prejudice is presumed. See id. Furthermore, 
where Appellant's defense attorney, John Caine, had a conflict of interest that rendered 
his assistance to Appellant ineffective. Morrison had brought on Caine as his advisor; 
hence, any conflict of interest would be impugned on both counsel. 
It is a legitimate trial strategy in sexual offense cases to pursue a defendant's 
diagnosed mental illness or defect as a defense for inability to form the required mental 
state element of a crime. See Utah Code Ann. §77-2-305(1 )(a) (2003). In State v. 
Seale, the Utah Supreme Court held that trial counsel's "decision to assert an insanity 
defense did not fall below the standard of reasonable professional assistance." 853 P.2d 
862,868 (Utah 1993). It was a "legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the 
choice of trial strategy" for Seale's counsel to invoke Section 77-2-305 and argue "that 
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Seale had been mentally ill during the incidents of abuse." Id. at 867-8. The 
reasonableness of this defense was based upon the fact that Seale had a history of 
schizophrenia and severe depression and that "a hospital psychologist and a doctor 
opined that Seale had been mentally ill during the time the alleged abuse occurred." Id. 
at 868. 
In the instant case, trial counsel avoided counseling his client on a legitimate 
defense of diminished capacity to avoid personal embarrassment and threats to his 
credibility where he would be forced to bring out testimony in Appellant's case that 
contradicted Caine's personal position and legal position as advocate on a prior case. 
c) Caine's Coercion of Peterson Despite a Good Chance of Acquittal and 
the Breakdown of the Attorney-Client Relationship and Trust 
Constituted an Actual Conflict of Interest that Adversely Affected 
Counsel's Performance and was Hence Presumed Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel 
Many courts have held that trial counsel's coercion of the defendant to enter a plea 
of guilty or no contest despite the lack of strong evidence against the defendant 
constitutes an actual conflict of interest where counsel's loyalty is divided between his 
assisting prosecution and his duty to represent his client's best interests. See, e.g., 
Nebraska v. Bishop, 295 NW2d 698, 700-02 (Neb. 1980) (finding no conflict infringing 
on the right to effective assistance where counsel "pressured" clients to entering plea of 
guilty only because of overwhelming weight of evidence presented by prosecution); In re 
Gay, 19 Cal.4* 771, 776-77. 968 P.2d 476,487-88 (Call 1998) (holding attorney's urging 
and coercing his client to confess and stipulate to serial robberies without advising client 
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of consequences thereof and where prosecution only had weak circumstantial evidence 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel). 
[I]f an irreconcilable conflict exists between a client and his attorney, it is unlikely 
that an atmosphere conducive to open communication between an attorney and client will 
exist." White v. White, 602 F.Supp. 173, 176 (W.D.Mo. 1984). In support of this rule, 
the court referred to American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, stating 
that "[n]othing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the 
establishment of trust and confidence." Id. (citing American Bar Association Standards 
for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-3.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)). "Defense counsel should seek 
to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with the accused...." Id. "An attorney 
has an actual.. .conflict of interest when, during the course of the representation, the 
attorney's and defendant's interests 'diverge with respect to a material factual or legal 
issue or to a course of action.'" Winkler v. Keane, F.3d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Cuylerv. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1722 n. 3, 64 
L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (J. Marshall, concurring in part, dissenting in part)). 
False promises by counsel also contribute to the breakdown of the attorney-client 
relationship and trust and constitute prima facie ineffective assistance of counsel. In 
Moench v. State, the Utah Supreme Court mentioned in dicta that where a trial counsel 
did not keep his promise to his client in a critical part of the proceedings, the attorney was 
ineffective. 57 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Utah 2003). Moench asserted that he had entered a 
guilty plea "because his counsel told him that he, the attorney, would later move the court 
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to reduce his charges." Id. at 1118. His counsel failed to make such a motion. Id. With 
this and the fact trial counsel had failed to object to sentencing based upon an outmoded 
version of a statute, the court stated "Moench has made a prima facie claim that his 
counsel was ineffective." Id. Although ruhng on whether the defendant could withdraw 
his plea, not a claim of ineffective counsel, the Utah Court of Appeals has found a plea 
coercive when a defendant pleads guilty based on "an exaggerated belief in the benefits 
of his plea." State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305,110, 57 P.3d 238, 241 (2002) (quoting 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1276 (Utah 1988). 
The presence of an actual conflict has been recognized when trial counsel urges 
his client to enter a plea under duress. In Zeiszler v. Florida, the defendant alleged that at 
the time he entered his plea, "he was under a great deal of emotional and mental distress 
and believed he did not have a viable alternative." 765 So.2d 128, 129 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 
2000). The defendant asserted that "he had been coerced by defense counsel to enter the 
plea" and that counsel had "insisted he take the plea. Id. 
In factoring in whether trial counsel coerced a Petitioner, this Court should 
consider such subjective factors as whether the defendant was subject to easy 
manipulation by his counsel and whether counsel knew or should have known his client 
was psychologically and emotionally vulnerable to outside influence. In cases 
determining whether a confession is voluntary or coerced, Utah courts have considered 
the defendant's "mental condition a more significant factor in the 'voluntariness' 
calculus." State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 984 P.2d 1009, 1014 (Utah 1999) (quoting 
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Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d (1986)). The Utah 
Supreme Court has thus set forth that in such an analysis of coercion under the totality of 
circumstances analysis, "courts must also consider such factors as the defendant's mental 
health, mental deficiency, emotional instability, education, age, and familiarity with the 
judicial system." Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1014 (citing Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 
712, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967) (education); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 
U.S. 568, 602-03, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) (mental deficiency); Spano v. 
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959) (emotional 
instability); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246 (1957) 
(mental health)). 
So long as the district court applied mental factors under a totality of the 
circumstances analysis, the Utah Supreme Court approved of the district courts' 
considering factors such as that the defendant: "(a) was suffering from A.D.D.; (b) had 
the maturity level of a fifteen year-old; (c) had a below average I.Q.; (d) had fear of the 
death penalty being imposed; and (e) was more susceptible to stress and coercion than the 
average person." Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1014. The Court: also found dispositive the 
fact that the persons who were allegedly behaving coercively toward the defendant knew 
of defendant's mental vulnerability. Id. 
Hence, in summary, an actual conflict exists where counsel coerces his client to 
plea guilty when there is a good chance of acquittal. Coercion can be found when the 
client is mentally vulnerable to persuasion and pressure by the attorney because of mental 
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illness, low I.Q. or maturity, high susceptibility to stress, and feelings of duress. 
Coercion can be found where the attorney prevails on the client his wishes of the client's 
entering a plea where the client and the attorney have divergent interests or 
disagreements with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action. 
Finally, an actual conflict exists where false promises and other adversarial behavior by 
counsel toward the client contribute to the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship 
and trust. These all constitute prima facie ineffective assistance of counsel. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks on order of this Court reversing the trial court's denial of his 
Petition for Post-conviction Relief and thus thereby setting aside the trial court's 
acceptance of the no-contest plea, vacating the conviction in Case No. 041902251, and 
such further orders as will permit him a new trial. The Trial Court's acceptance of 
Appellant's plea, which he unwillingly and unintelligently entered, was in violation of 
Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant's defense attorney, John Caine, 
had a conflict of interest that rendered his assistance to Appellant ineffective. Morrison 
had brought on Caine as his advisor; hence, any conflict of interest would be impugned 
on both counsel. Caine pressured Appellant repeatedly knowing that Appellant was 
emotionally and mentally vulnerable and that if Appellant went to trial eh would want to 
put his character at issue. By putting his character at issue, Appellant would have to bring 
up the abuse that Caine's former client caused Appellant and how that has made 
Appellant even more sensitive than ever to children. For that reason, and for the other 
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foregoing reasons, Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that the Trial Court's Order 
denying his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief be reversed where the law, along with the 
facts, as admitted, supports a holding that Mr. Peterson did not enter his plea intelligently 
and voluntarily. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITED this 22 day of December, 2008. 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
KIMBERLY J. TRUPIANO 
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This case is before the court on the remaining issues arising out of Petitioner's Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief. An evidentiary hearing on these issues was held before the court on 
November 26, 2007 where all parties were represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the 
evidence, the parties counsel agreed to submit their closing arguments in writing to the court 
which the court has now reviewed. 
Specifically, the remaining issues to be determined fall under two categories. The first is 
whether defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered including whether there was 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The second is whether petitioner received ineffective 
assistance of counsel at the time he entered his plea due to a conflict of interest. 
The background facts supporting the court's decision are as follows: 
1. Petitioner was charged in Weber County with Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child a lsl 
degree felony on or about April 22, 2004. 
2. Petitioner was represented throughout the proceedings by attorneys John Caine, now 
deceased, and William Morrison. 
3. During this time petitioner was also charged in Davis County with a felony sex offense 
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against a child. 
4. The victim in the Davis County case was not the same victim as in Weber County. 
5. John Caine and William Morrison represented petitioner in the Davis County case also. 
6. Before petitioner was charged with these offenses, petitioner's son died while in the care of a 
daycare center in either Weber or Davis County. 
7. The operator of the daycare center, Ms. Daines, was charged with murder. 
8. John Caine represented Ms. Daines in that case. 
9. Ms. Daines was acquitted of the charge. 
10. Petitioner and his family retained William Momson to represent petitioner in the sex crime 
cases in both Davis and Weber Counties apparently because Mr. Morrison was also representing 
petitioner and his family in a wrongful death civil case against Ms. Daines. 
11. William Morrison suggested that the family retain John Caine to act as co-counsel for 
petitioner in the criminal cases because he was impressed with Mr. Caine's ability as a criminal 
defense attorney having spent a considerable time reviewing the record of Mr. Caine's 
performance in the criminal case against Ms. Daines.. 
12. Mr. Morrison testified that he recognized that the petitioner may have some animosity 
toward Mr. Caine because he represented Ms. Daines who had allegedly murdered petitioner's 
son. 
13. However, petitioner and his family agreed to have Mr. Caine act as co-counsel in this case 
presumably because of Mr. Caine's excellent ability as a criminal defense attorney and in Mr. 
Morrison's words "the family and Boyd were okay with it." 
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14. After nearly a year and a half, petitioner entered a plea of no contest to Sexual Abuse of a 
Minor a 2"d degree felony in Weber County. 
15. In conjunction with that pica, counsel for the defense and the state approached the court 
with a proposed agreement that in exchange for a no contest plea the court would impose 
probation rather than a prison term and, if jail was imposed, the state would not object to work 
release. 
16. The court agreed that, absent some unexpected discovery in the presentence report revealing 
other sex offenses, or the like, the court would go along with the sentencing recommendations as 
outlined. 
17. In conjunction with that, the court was adamant that the victim's family would have to agree 
to the resolution. 
18. The state assured the court that the family was agreeable with the recommendation and 
specifically that the father of the victim was mainly concerned, at that point, that petitioner 
(defendant) would plead to an offense that would require him to register with the Sex Offender 
Registry. 
19. There was never a suggestion that the victim's family would not allow the victim to testify if 
the case proceeded to trial. 
20. In both the Davis and Weber county cases, defendant consistently maintained that he was 
innocent of the charges. 
21. While the two criminal cases involved different victims, both had similar fact scenarios 
alleged, specifically, that the victim was sitting on defendant's lap with other people in the area 
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and that defendant placed his hand down the pants of the victim and fondled her private parts. 
DECISION 
The court has previously entered its decision on the issue regarding the probation violation. 
The remaining issues addressed at the evidentiary hearing are: 
1, Did petitioner enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily? As part of this issue petitioner 
claims that the court conducted an inadequate plea colloquy which resulted in the failure of 
petitioner to knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea. In addition petitioner claims that counsel 
intimidated him into entering a plea instead of proceeding to trial. While not part of the original 
petition, petitioner now alleges, in addition, that petitioner was incompetent to enter a plea, and 
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize the incompetence and request a 
competency hearing.. 
2. Did petitioner's trial counsel have a conflict of interest that resulted in prejudice to the 
petitioner? As part of this issue, petitioner claims that he had a mental infirmity defense that he 
was not advised of as a result of the alleged conflict of interest, and petitioner was coerced into 
pleading guilty by counsel not adequately explaining the consequences of the plea and by counsel 
making derogatory remarks to petitioner. 
The court gives its decision as follows and necessarily makes findings of fact based on the 
evidentiary hearing which are incorporated herein. 
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As to the first issue, the standard for determining whether a plea has been knowing and 
voluntarily entered does not turn on whether there was a Rule 11 violation in taking the plea. 
Petitioner's argument that the court did nol properly conduct a full Rule 11 colloquy with 
petitioner is not a sufficient basis for granting post conviction relief. Rather the standard is 
whether the defendant at the time he entered his plea did so, in fact, knowingly and voluntarily. 
That is not to say that the events surrounding the taking of the plea, including the colloquy, 
are not important in the context of determining whether the plea was voluntarily and knowingly 
entered. However, if there was a Rule 11 violation, it is not presumptive that there was a 
problem with the plea in this kind of proceeding. 
In the instant case, at the plea hearing, the court determined that defense counsel, Mr. Caine, 
read the statement in support of plea verbatim to the defendant. When the court asked defendant 
whether he had read the plea statement, Mr. Caine informed the court that he had read it verbatim 
line by line. At that time defendant is observed on the video tape nodding his head in agreement. 
Tire court then asked defendant if he understood what was read to him. The defendant 
acknowledged that he did in fact understand. The court acknowledged that the plea agreement 
recited defendant's rights as well as stated the elements of the offense. The court then 
summarized the rights included in the statement but did not go through all the rights enumerated 
in Rule 11 since the plea agreement did that. The defendant was then asked if he wanted the 
court to go through what was contained in the plea statement. Defendant said he did not and 
once again acknowledged that he did in fact understand the contents of the plea statement. He 
also acknowledges signing it. At a later point during the plea proceeding, the court asked Mr. 
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Caine if he had any reason to think defendant didn't understand what was going on and Mr. 
Caine responded: "Not at all." 
Petitioner now asserts that Mr. Caine did not read the entire statement to him but rather 
skipped over parts of it saying that certain parts were not applicable. Apparently at the time the 
statement was read to petitioner, only Mr. Caine and petitioner were present. Petitioner claims 
that his attorneys just told him that if he did what they told him to do that he'd be able to go 
home to his family and it would be over. He testified at the post conviction evidentiary hearing 
that he did not understand that he had a right to a trial and that he was presumed innocent. He 
claims he did not understand what probation was; just that he would have to talk to cops and see 
them at certain time. He also claims that Mr. Caine said there would be no jail. 
Petitioner also claimed in the Davis County case, in his post conviction petition there, that the 
plea statement was not read to him in that case. Mr. Morrison, the counsel who was primarily 
handling the case in Davis County, testified at the post conviction hearing in Weber County that 
he had in fact spent considerable time going over the statement with the defendant and had in fact 
read it line by line to him. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Caine was not available to testify since he died shortly before the post 
conviction hearing in Weber County. That notwithstanding, given all the evidence presented to 
the court, the court finds that petitioner's claim that the statement was not read to him is false. 
He nodded when the court asked if the statement was read to him, he acknowledged to the court 
twice that he understood the plea statement, he made the same false claim in Davis County, and 
did not raise this issue until after he violated probation and was sent to prison. Mr. Caine 
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affirmatively represented to the court, twice, that he had read the statement to petitioner. 
Petitioner's claim that the statement was not read to him is simply not credible. 
Defendant's claim that he did not understand that he had a right to a trial and that he had a 
presumption of innocence is also not credible since the court specifically pointed out those rights 
to defendant at the time of the plea. The court stated: "You have a right to a trial in the case, a 
right to have counsel cross examine all the witnesses that would be brought in against you. You 
have a right to be present at trial when the witnesses testify against you. You have a right to a 
jury trial, and that's what was scheduled in the case. You have a right not to testify at your trial, 
and you're presumed innocent of the offense until proven otherwise, and a jury will be so 
instructed." To this the defendant stated that he understood. 
Petitioner's affidavit in support of his petition also shows that he understood the nature of the 
proceedings. The affidavit states that he told his attorneys that he wanted to go to trial and call 
witnesses including himself and his daughter to testify. 
It can also be inferred from petitioner's actions and words that he understood the potential 
penalties in the case. He readily interrupted the court at sentencing to ask that he be given work 
release which demonstrates that lie anticipated going to jail. He certainly did not show any 
surprise or outrage that he was going to jail rather than just being sent home to be with his family 
as he claims he expected. 
Petitioner cannot also now credibly claim that he was bullied into entering a plea by his 
attorneys or the court. As the State cogently describes in their written closing argument: 
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Petitioner's behavior at his court appearances belie his current attempt to 
portray himself as a shy, manipulable follower. At the plea hearing, petitioner 
was not looking to Mr.Caine for cues. Petitioner did not hesitate to answer the 
Court's questions or indicate his agreement or answers by nodding his head. At 
the plea hearing, as well as his other court appearances petitioner did not hesitate 
to initiate conversations with his attorneys, to answer the Court's questions, or 
even interrupt the Court and express concerns. 
Petitioner's character and assertiveness is also demonstrated graphically in his taped sexually 
explicit conversation with his minor niece which constituted the probation violation. His 
questions, comments, and suggestiveness to his niece border on bullying and certainly do not 
demonstrate a meek, easily manipulated, shy person. Quite the contrary. 
The court also took a factual basis for the plea from the state. Because the defendant was 
entering a no contest plea, the court asked the state to proffer what their evidence would be at the 
time of trial. The state proffers that the victim would testify that "(the defendant) picked her up, 
placed her on his lap, put his hand down the front of her pants on the bare skin, and touched her 
genitals." The child was six years old. The defendant entered a no contest plea at which time the 
court found that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and the state had offered 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction in the case. The court went on to 
acknowledge that there would be recommendations for fomial probation and not an initial prison 
term, however, the court also informed defendant that if he violated probation any 
recommendations for no prison would not come into play. Mr. Caine also stated the agreement 
he had reached with the state for a recommendation to the court and acknowledged that if jail 
time was imposed there would be a recommendation for work release. 
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Based on the above, it is clear that the court properly incorporated the plea statement into the 
record in support of defendant's plea of no contest and the plea statement had been read to 
petitioner in its entirety and he signed it. Any claim that the plea was not knowingly and 
voluntarily entered cannot be based on the failure of the court and counsel to advise petitioner of 
his rights. 
The next related issue is petitioner's claim that he was not competent to enter his plea, despite 
his statements to the court that he understood what was going on, and that counsel was 
ineffective for not recognizing this and asking for a competency hearing. This issue is more 
factually complex and a determination of the validity of petitioner's claim hinges on a host of 
factors. 
The standard for determining incompetence to proceed is set forth in Utah Code. Ann. § 77-
15-2: 
(A) person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental disorder 
or mental retardation resulting either in : 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. 
It is undisputed in this case that counsel did not request a competency hearing. It is also the 
observation of this court that the judge did not note anything that would have triggered in her 
mind a need for a competency hearing. At the time of the plea, defendant acknowledged that he 
understood the plea statement which contained both a recitation of the elements of the offense, 
the potential penalties, and the rights he was giving up by entering his plea. Counsel 
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acknowledged at the time of the plea that there was no reason to think defendant did not 
understand. 
Significantly, Mr. Morrison testified at the post conviction hearing that he and Mr. Caine met 
with defendant and his family members before the plea was entered where Mr. Caine outlined the 
various options available to defendant by writing them out on a blackboard. The risks of 
proceeding to trial were spelled out as was the possibility of life in prison if defendant was 
convicted at trial. Mr. Morrison acknowledged that both he and Mr. Caine were willing to 
proceed to a jury trial if defendant wanted that. Mr. Morrison also acknowledged that both he 
and Mr. Caine strongly urged defendant to plead no contest to the lesser charge given that he had 
a 50-50 chance of being found guilty at trial. Their advice, simply put, was that he would be a 
"fool" to reject the plea bargain which earned with it a very lenient recommendation of probation 
rather than prison. Mr. Morrison went on to state that he considered the plea bargain a "victory" 
in light of the difficulty they would have overcoming a young victim's testimony at trial where 
there was no motive to lie. Furthermore, the progress they had made in negotiating with the 
prosecution was tremendous given that the State originally was unwilling to make any kind of 
deal. Mr. Morrison also testified that if he were to counsel petitioner today his 
advice would be the same-take the plea deal. 
Mr. Morrison also testified that it was his observation that defendant understood the charge 
and the potential penalties. Petitioner's characterization of Mr. Morrison's testimony and 
demeanor as being defensive, self-protective, and lashing out is not accurate. The court does not 
view Mr. Morrison's testimony that way at all. The court would characterize Mr. Morrison's 
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testimony as objective and credible. Mr. Morrison testified that the only difficulty counsel had 
with defendant was that defendant would become uncooperative when he was confronted with 
either questions he did not want to answer or confronted with the limitations of options available 
to him. For instance, defendant would act like he did not understand what they were saying when 
confronted with the question of how the victim got on his lap in the first place. Since this was a 
question that the State would "hammer on" at trial, as defense counsel they wanted to know how 
to counter it, but, they simply could not get him to answer that question. Also when confronted 
with the option of how he would plead, defendant would keep asking why he had to do anything. 
It was counsel's impression that when the defendant did not like the question asked or was 
confronted with options he was unwilling to choose from he would become recalcitrant. Ii was at 
those times that Mr. Morrison acknowledged counsel would become frustrated with defendant, 
although he does not recall any time that names were called. 
Mr. Morrison further testified that he simply did not see any signs that defendant suffered 
from a diminished capacity or incompetence. Mr. Morrison further noted that defendant 
graduated from high school and held a job at Hill Air Force Base paying $23.00 per hour. While 
defendant was "slow" Mr. Morrison testified that they did not feel they could meet the significant 
burden of showing a diminished capacity and that issue was discussed between counsel. 
In short, based on Mr. Morrison's testimony, it is clear to the court that counsel noted that 
defendant was somewhat slow but that his capacity did not rise to the level of diminished 
capacity in a legal sense. Counsel concluded that while defendant could be recalcitrant in areas 
Decision 
Peterson vs. State 
Case Number 060906594 RN 
Page Twelve 
that he did not want to address or acknowledge, he understood the charge and penalties 
associated with it. 
There is a great deal of other evidence which corroborates Mr. Morrison's observations and 
conclusions. Those will be listed as follows: 
1. Neither petitioner nor petitioner's family ever told the court or counsel that petitioner was 
incapable of understanding or that he did not understand not until petitioner had been sentenced 
to prison on the probation violation that is. 
2. In May of 2004 prior to the plea, Dr. Rick Hawks conducted a Psychological, Sexual 
Behavioral, and Risk Assessment of petitioner which consisted of a test including 2000 questions 
which petitioner was able to complete. The results showed that petitioner was "faking good" 
meaning that he was dissimulating-attempting to make himself look better than he was, 
minimizing, and otherwise not accurately answering all the questions to reflect his true state. 
This conduct is similar to that which Mr. Morrison observed and which is described above. The 
tests administered also contain an internal component which allow a check to determine whether 
someone doesn't understand or is just randomly answering questions. The results showed that 
petitioner understood the test and the questions. Although the examination done by Dr. Hawks 
was not performed to determine competency the fact that petitioner was able to complete the 
exam shows a minimal level of competency. It should be noted however that the testing also 
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showed that petitioner had a low 1Q falling in the borderline range. 
3. In the presentence report prepared after petitioner entered his no contest plea, petitioner's 
written statement makes it clear that petitioner knew what he was charged with. In his own 
words he states as follows: 
"(The victim's) claim is that I put her on my lap and put my hands down inside 
her levis, and fondled her. It would be very difficult to put anyone's hands in side 
a childs pants while they are sitting on your lap with out having the pants 
unbuttoned and unzipped. Especially with a child and my large hands. My 
feelings about this is that it did not happen." 
Petitioner's counsel insinuates in closing argument that because the statement was typed, and, 
petitioner was likely not capable of typing it, that the statement is not his own. The problem with 
this argument is that petitioner specifically stated at the hearing that the statement was in fact his 
own. Clearly, petitioner identifies the essential elements of the offense he was charged with and 
even articulates a defense of impossibility to the charge. 
4. Attached to the presentence report are two letters from petitioner's employer which state the 
following: 
"Mr. Boyd Peterson has proven to be a valuable asset to the Airborne Generator 
Flight mission in support of the United States Air Force. Working as a contractor 
for several years within our organization, his professionalism and dedication was 
recognized with his selection as a full-time Government employee in February 
2005. He continues to display those same attributes on a daily basis and we feel 
very fortunate to have him as a valued member of our Air Force Team." 
(Undated, signed by William M. Tews, Flight Chief, Airborne Generators) 
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A second letter of recommendation stales: 
"I've had the opportunity to work with Mr. Boyd Peterson for the past two years. 
During that time Boyd has proven to be an excellent employee. He is timely, 
reliable and completes any work assigned in a professional manner. He works 
well with his peers and has had no disciplinary action taken against him." 
(Undated, signed by Larry D. Ballard, Flight Chief, Ground Powers System) 
Both of these letters do not comment on an individual who is incapable of understanding things. 
They are inconsistent with petitioner's claims now that "I don't understand what people tell me" 
or that he is mentally retarded. 
5. Also attached to the presentence report are a series of letters from petitioner's family that 
reflect that petitioner understood his options and made a reasoned choice to enter a no contest 
plea. Nowhere in those communications do family members express their concern that petitioner 
didn't understand what he was doing. Excerpts from those letters are as follows: 
Letter from Gail and Earl Peterson (mother and father): 
"Boyd's attorney said there is a 50-50 chance of losing this case, and Boyd chose 
to take a plea rather than a chance of leaving his family and going to prison." 
Letter from Michael Peterson (brother): 
"Taking a plea was the best of two choices for his family. Having to have his 
oldest daughter testify in court ... after all she has suffered in her young life, he 
really felt the choice was to prevent any further pain to her. Therefore he took a 
plea. This was a hard decision but knowing the trauma it would cause for her 
having to be in court again was more than he could endure or have her face." 
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6. The court handed down petitioner's sentence on the no contest plea consistent with what it 
had indicated it would do-suspended prison with a jail sentence and work release along with 
formal probation. Neither petitioner nor his family raised the issue that petitioner didn't 
understand what he had plead to nor did they raise an issue that he thought he was simply going 
to be able to go home to his family rather than go to jail. 
7. The first indication to the court that petitioner was claiming a problem with the manner in 
which his plea was taken was after his probation was revoked and he was sent to prison for 
violating the terms of his probation specifically by making a sexually explicit phone call to his 
underage niece from the jail. A letter petitioner wrote to his mother (Exhibit 22) although 
undated indicates that "I did not understand what no contest meant." That letter was written by 
petitioner while he was in prison, long after the entry of his plea. 
8. While in the jail awaiting sentencing on his probation violation, Dr. Rick Hawkes was asked 
to visit him to review mental health issues. Petitioner reported at that time that he was having a 
total mental breakdown, that he couldn't think straight, and that he didn't even know who he 
was. The jail according to Dr. Hawkes was not treating petitioner as having a serious mental 
breakdown, and it was Dr. Hawkes observation that this was not a true mental breakdown. 
Rather, petitioner was saying things such as: "I'll do whatever J can to get out" and "If I don't get 
out I'll kill myself." Dr. Hawkes interpreted these threats as simply efforts to manipulate his 
surroundings. 
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The evidence presented at the postconviction hearing in support of petitioner's claims of 
incompetence consisted of testimony from family members who stated they did not think 
petitioner underslood what was going on, even though they never told anyone including the court 
this, and a psychologist, Dr. Victoria Burgess who examined petitioner over a year after he 
entered his plea. The family members' testimony is not consistent with the letters sent to the 
court in connection with the presentence report quoted above. In those letters they clearly 
understood and reflected that petitioner understood that by taking the plea he was choosing 
between the lesser of two evils, by avoiding a prison sentence initially anyway. Even their 
testimony regarding petitioner asking the same questions over and over again is consistent with 
Mr. Morrison's observations that petitioner repeatedly asked why he had to do anything despite 
their telling him repeatedly what his options were. Mr. Morrison's conclusion was that petitioner 
was avoiding the inevitable and avoiding reality by repeating the questions. He simply did not 
want to understand because he did not like his choices. Ultimately, however, he did make a 
choice to plead no contest; a choice that was described in the family letters above. 
As for Dr. Burgess1 testimony and report, the court notes that the standard she applied for 
incompetence really does not meet the statutory standard quoted at the outset of this decision. 
Dr. Burgess concludes that petitioner would "have some difficulty disclosing pertinent facts, 
events and states of mind. He would have an extremely difficult time comprehending and 
appreciating the range and nature of possible penalties that may be imposed in the proceedings 
against him and engaging in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options. Therefore, Boyd 
Peterson was not competent to enter a plea of no contest. It is all best summed up in Boyd 
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Peterson's own words, '1 did not want to go to jail and 1 wanted to return to my family. 1 listen to 
people because they are smarter than me.'" 
The legal standard is not that someone would have difficulty with the tasks identified above 
but that they are unable to do them. Furthermore, Dr. Burgess did not review the videotape of 
the plea nor did she consult with petitioner's counsel, both important sources of information as to 
petitioner's state of mind at the time he entered his plea. Instead Dr. Burgess talked with 
petitioner's mother, administered some basic psychological tests, and appears to have relied 
primarily on petitioner's own self serving assessment. Petitioner's mantra at the post conviction 
relief hearing was " 1 just don't understand what people tell me." That statement is plainly 
disingenuous. Taken at face value it may appear to support a conclusion that petitioner was 
incompetent to enter a plea, and his attorneys should have recognized it. The problem is that it 
not true. This was a grown man, albeit with a low IQ ,who had and supported a family, held a 
good paying job at Hill Air Force Base, was buying a home, was able to drive a car and 
presumably pass a driver's test, and who functioned day to day in an apparently adequate, nomial 
way. He gave no indication to the court that he was incompetent. His attorneys apparently did 
not recognize any signs that he was incompetent. A low IQ and even mental retardation do not 
automatically result in an assessment of incompetence. The totality of the circumstances and 
observations of everyone involved at the time of his plea lead to an opposite conclusion. Given 
all these factors, it cannot be said that petitioner's counsel was ineffective for not asking for a 
competency hearing. 
The second issue concerns whether petitioner's counsel Mr. Caine had a conflict of interest. 
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The standard for determining whether counsel had a conflict of interest is that the conflict must 
be actual and must have negatively affected counsel's performance in such a way that counsel 
sought to advance his own interests rather than his client's. State v. Lovell 984 P.2d 382 (Utah 
1999). 
In the instant case, Mr. Caine, one of petitioner's attorneys, had previously represented Ms. 
Daines who was charged with murdering petitioner's son while he was in her care. That person 
was acquitted of the charge. Mr. Morrison testified that petitioner and his family agreed to have 
Mr. Caine act as co-counsel and represent petitioner in this case. Therefore, petitioner waived 
any conflict of interest claim. 
Secondly, there does not appear to be any actual conflict of interest. As Mr. Morrison 
testified, they were two unrelated cases. 
Even assuming that there may have been a conflict of interest, there is no showing that Mr. 
Caine acted in a way that adversely affect petitioner in his representation. Petitioner claims that 
Mr. Came would not have been willing to allow him to testify that he never would have been 
able to hurt a child because his own son had been murdered because Mr. Caine still had a loyalty 
to Ms. Daines who he supposedly believed was innocent. The problem with this argument is that 
il simply does not follow that Mr. Caine's defense of Ms. Daines would have precluded him from 
presenting testimony in petitioner's case that petitioner was depressed at his son's death and held 
the belief that his son had been murdered. Furthermore, it would not have precluded petitioner 
from testifying that this condition would prevent petitioner from hurting a child. The connection 
that petitioner is trying to make between the two cases is a non sequitur. 
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While petitioner's counsel may have discouraged him from testifying, Mr. Morrison pointed 
out that the reason was not due to Mr. Caine's representation of Ms. Dairies, but rather stemmed 
from the concern that the Davis County case pending against petitioner may have become 
relevant in the instant case if the character defense was raised. Specifically, raising this kind of 
character defense could have opened the door to evidence of the details of the Davis County case 
which was strikingly similar to the instant one. As Mr. Morrison testified, if evidence of the 
Davis County case would have been allowed into evidence because of the character defense 
petitioner claims he wanted to raise, the result would have been devastating to petitioner's 
credibility in front of a jury. 
As far as Mr. Caine's alleged conflict because of a reluctance to assert a diminished capacity 
or insanity defense, Mr. Morrison testified that they, as petitioner's counsel, did explore this 
possibility but felt that it did not have viability. Furthermore, as the State points out, the defense 
assumes that the alleged conduct occurred, something that petitioner has consistently denied. 
In sum, petitioner has not met his burden of showing a conflict of interest. Even if one were 
to find a conflict, however, it cannot be reasonably said to have affected counsel's performance. 
Instead, Mr. Caine negotiated a very favorable plea agreement, approved by the court in advance, 
which virtually guaranteed probation and avoided a very real potential of a life sentence in 
prison. 
Furthermore, the credibility of petitioner and his family who testified is severely 
compromised. Petitioner is desperate to be released from prison after his serious probation 
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violation landed him there, lie docs not want to be in jail or prison and, as he stated in March of 
2006, he would do anything to get out. Petitioner's family is also desperate to see petitioner 
released. They have supported petitioner from the beginning of the case, even denying the 
serious nature of petitioner's probation violation which victimized petitioner's brother's own 
minor daughter and his mother's granddaughter. Even to this day they continue to characterize 
the sexual deviance of petitioner in the probation violation as a "joke" or an attempt to make the 
young lady feel pretty. They are in serious denial as is the petitioner. 
The Petition for Post Conviction release is denied. That State will review its proposed 
Findings of Fact and include any portions of this opinion that are not included. 
DATED this day of] 
JLOO? 
PAMELA G. HEFFEKNAN 
District Court Judge 
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